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Abstract: 
 
Denis Goulet (1931-2006) was a pioneer of human development theory and a founder of 
work on ‘development ethics’ as a self-conscious field that treats the ethical and value 
questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice. The paper looks at aspects 
of Goulet’s work in relation to four issues concerning this project of development ethics—
scope, methodology, roles, and organisational format and identity. It compares his views 
with subsequent trends in the field and suggests lessons for work on human development. 
While his definition of the scope of development ethics remains serviceable, his methodology 
of intense immersion by a ‘development ethicist’ in each context under examination was 
rewarding but limited by the time and skills it requires and a relative disconnection from 
communicable theory. He wrote profoundly about ethics’ possible lines of influence, 
including through incorporation in methods, movements and education, but his own ideas 
wait to be sufficiently incorporated. He proposed development ethics as a new 
(sub)discipline, yet the immersion in particular contexts and their routine practices that is 
required for understanding and influence must be by people who remain close to specific 
disciplinary and professional backgrounds. Development ethics has to be, he eventually 
came to accept, not a distinct (sub)discipline but an interdisciplinary field. 
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The career of Denis Goulet: lessons for human development and development ethics 
 
“[W]hat kind of development can be considered ‘human’?” asked the American 
philosopher, anthropologist and social planner Denis Goulet (1971a: 236). Already in 
1960 he wrote, following his mentor Louis Lebret, that ‘development’ means “changes 
which allow human beings, both as individual persons and as members of groups, to 
move from one condition of life to one which is more human in some meaningful way” 
(1960: 14; 2006a: 7). His 1971 book The Cruel Choice declared: “The aim of this work is 
to thrust debates over economic and social development into the arena of ethical values. 
… Is human development something more than a systemic combination of modern 
bureaucracy, efficient technology, and productive economy?” (1971a: vii). 
Development’s “ultimate goals are those of existence itself: to provide all men with the 
opportunity to lead full human lives” (1971a: x). He presented an ideal of “full, 
comprehensive human development” (1979: 556), and praised the Sri Lankan Sarvodaya 
movement’s “concept of human development…[based on] respect for all life and the 
concept of the well-being of all” (1979: 559). 
 It is worth looking back at Goulet’s career to identify questions and possible lessons 
for the work on human development and capabilities initiated by Sen, Haq and 
Nussbaum. Well before them, he advocated that “authentic development aims toward the 
realization of human capabilities in all spheres” (Goulet 1971b: 205), and stressed that 
economic growth and technological modernity must be treated as, at best, potential means 
towards considered human values, not vice versa. At the same time he insisted that 
principles of ethics and religion had to be confronted by and relate to the full realities and 
complexities of modern economies (Goulet 1960: 23).  
 Denis Goulet (1931-2006) brought the French language project of ‘the ethics of 
development’ into the Spanish, Portuguese, and English language literatures and led this 
work for a generation. In considering possible lessons for work on human development 
the paper does not attempt to cover all aspects of Goulet’s thought, for example the 
particular ethical principles that he advocated.
i
 We will look at four issues concerning the 
project of ‘development ethics’: (1) its scope; does it, for example, cover too much, and 
thereby nothing in depth?; (2) the methodology for such work; (3) its roles; has it any 
realistic lines of influence, and on whom?; and (4) its choice of organisational format and 
identity—is it to be seen as a (sub)discipline or not?—which should reflect considered 
stances on scope, methodology and roles. 
Goulet’s definition of the scope of development ethics combined a broad view of it as 
social change ethics, with an implied core audience consisting of those who see themselves 
as working in development studies or development policy. Does this allow development 
ethics to be a unified field on a (sub)disciplinary model? Goulet did advocate it as a new 
(sub)discipline, but will that format promote the required depth of understanding and 
influence? Goulet thought hard about when and how ethics can have influence, including 
through embodiment in methodologies, and envisaged a humane ethics as ‘the means of 
the means’. Just as the means available for ‘implementation’—the resources and 
organisations, persons and procedures—determine how declared purposes actually work 
out, so, he advised, ethics should help to structure those means so as to guide how they 
will operate in practice. 
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 The term development ethics emerged in the mid-20
th
 century in the work led by the 
French socio-economist Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966), founder in 1941 of the 
research centre Économie et Humanisme. Lebret worked extensively on a humanistic 
approach to national and international development. He “never tired of quoting with 
approval the phrase coined by Francois Perroux”, his colleague, that development is for 
“every person and the whole person” (“tous les hommes et tout l’homme”) (Goulet 2006a: 
58; 2000: 34). Economic might must not be equated to societal right (Goulet 2006a: 4). 
 Goulet became Lebret’s student and protégé. After a training in philosophy and 
theology he spent one and a half years in religious communities that lived amongst poor 
and marginal groups in France, Spain, and Algeria, during 1957-58. He then studied and 
worked with the Économie et Humanisme group for three years in Paris and Lebanon. 
Lebret led him to “define my life’s work to become a development ethicist operating in 
its several registers—theory, analysis, pedagogy, planning, and field practice” (Goulet 
2006a: xxxi). 
 In 1960 Goulet published “Pour une éthique moderne du développement”, a 
manifesto for “a practical ethics of development” (Goulet 1960: 12) that would transcend 
the rupture between utopian normative political theory that was not grounded in real life 
and predictive theory that had no interest in ethics. It should attend to the full 
development of persons (1960: 23) and not conflate the concepts of ‘goods’ and ‘good’, 
or ‘having’ and ‘being’ (a contrast stressed by Lebret among others); and should give 
balanced attention to the responsibilities of each of “governments, private investors, 
owners and labour unions” in relation to the development of all of a country and of all 
countries (1960: 12).  
 Goulet spent four years in Brazil in the early 1960s, undertaking doctoral research 
followed by technical cooperation work. His first book, Etica Del Desarrollo, appeared 
in 1965 in Spanish and in 1966 in Portuguese (Etica Do Desenvolvimento). Subsequently 
he did field research also in southern Spain, Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka, Mexico, and again 
Brazil, and worked too in Poland (Goulet 1992a). From 1979 to 2006 he was Professor of 
Education for Justice in the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame in 
Indiana, a charismatic voice who bridged disciplinary and theory-practice gaps. His most 
influential work, The Cruel Choice (1971a), prefigured much later development thinking, 
including current themes of human security. Its core concepts were ‘existence rationality’ 
and vulnerability (1971a: viii); chapter two was entitled “Vulnerability: the key to 
understanding and promoting development”. Goulet concluded that: “Every person and 
society wants to be treated by others as a being of worth, for its own sake and on its own 
terms, regardless of its utility or attractiveness to others” (Goulet 1975: 232). He 
proffered a “general lesson”: “every society must feel that its values are worthy of respect 
if it is to embark on an uncertain future with confidence in its own ability to control that 
future” (1971a: 49).   
 In a publishing career of half a century, Goulet did perhaps more than anyone to 
promote a notion of development ethics as a distinctive and required area in thought and 
practice: including in eleven books, such as The Uncertain Promise (1977), and 
Development Ethics (1995), and over 160 papers, including work on methods of 
participation and action research, technology transfer, and incentives and indicators. A 
selection of his lifetime’s writings has appeared as Development Ethics at Work: 
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Explorations 1960-2002 (Goulet, 2006a). Many papers are available on-line at 
http://www.nd.edu/~dgoulet.  
 
The scope and character of development ethics 
 
Development ethics as a body of work arose in the historical context of the gradual 
emergence of capacities to ensure, for example, clean water and essential drugs for 
everyone but the absence as yet of a working system of rights and responsibilities that 
will fulfil those possibilities. Two aspects deserve underlining: its global frame of 
reference and its focus on specific local realities, with thus an expectation of difference as 
well as an interest in commonality. Together these features make definition of a distinct 
field more difficult. 
 Development ethics starts from the inequalities and relationships within our world 
and within its parts. It deals explicitly with contexts in which markedly, even 
dramatically, different ethics coexist, and examines that coexistence. Mwanahewa, for 
example, proposes from a study of the concepts and causes of corruption in Uganda that, 
while much of the analysis internationally of corruption has had a generalised, 
universalist character, “it remains evident that the aspect of context, namely the meeting 
of the modern conventional and traditional, needs to be tackled”; “We can no longer 
afford to look at aspects of corruption and bribery as if the human race was one 
homogeneous lot.” (Mwanahewa 2006: 17). Goulet applied a similar principle, in an 
anthropological style that looks at real cultural and historical settings not some 
supposedly timeless ‘everywhere’. This context-specificity and the resultant comparative 
dimension are characteristic features in development ethics, even if not universal in nor 
unique to it. 
 In outlining an aspirant or emergent field or sub-field, one seeks to specify a scope 
which has a good theoretical rationale and at the same time finds a sufficient, interested 
audience. A field must be sufficiently distinctive and rewarding that enough people will 
listen and engage with it and continue to engage despite their limited time and the many 
competitors for their attention. The rationale of development studies in general is that 
social, political, economic, medical and environmental change are fundamentally 
interconnected; and that the interconnections demand close attention for they bring 
enormous threats and opportunities for humankind. Correspondingly, development is 
intensely ethically-laden - who benefits or loses, with respect to whose values; who 
decides, who is consulted, who is not? Development ethics is an untidily bounded subject 
about untidy and often unpleasant realities.  
 Goulet suggested therefore simply that development ethics considers the “ethical and 
value questions posed by development theory, planning and practice” (1977: 5). Its mission, 
he proposed, is “to diagnose value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and possible), and to 
validate or refute valuations placed on development performance” (1997b: 1168). These 
specifications had a number of implications.  
 First, as a field of practical ethics, development ethics should be grounded in intense 
observation of varied experience, not only the world-views of the powerful. Its normative 
discourses should be well related to empirical ones. 
 Second, the definition depends in turn on one’s definition of development. This can be 
an advantage: it means the definition can accomodate different views. Alternative bounds 
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for development ethics include (each to be qualified by the Goulet definition): (i) ‘the 
South’; (ii) the South plus North-South relations; (iii) all nations (we then have ‘social 
progress ethics’); (iv) global relations and global issues, not only inter-national ones; etc. 
Over time the case for broader bounds has steadily strengthened. Goulet always accepted it, 
as does current work on human development and capabilities. In a densely interconnected 
globe, where the quality and sustainability of the North’s ‘development’ are also profoundly 
in question, there is a strong case for taking the scope of development ethics to be social 
progress ethics in all nations and their interrelations, yet also some danger of losing a focus 
and an audience, and of losing a priority to the poorest. 
 However, thirdly, development ethics so conceived can at the same time still speak 
especially to relatively definite audiences that self-identify as development academics, 
funders, planners and practitioners, and their major clients, including students, rather than 
attempt to speak to everybody and as a result perhaps reach nobody. If development ethics 
tries to cover most of social ethics that could result in duplication, lack of focus, and over-
abstraction. Nigel Dower presents development ethics instead as the field that asks “How 
ought a society to exist and move into the future?”, as partner to the traditional field of 
personal ethics that asks “How ought one to live as an individual?”, and the emergent 
field of global ethics that asks the first question in terms of world society (Dower 1988). 
 In sum, Goulet’s flexible and pragmatic definition remains serviceable and allows us to 
combine a view of development ethics as social change ethics (and global change ethics) 
with yet a relatively specific primary audience—those who recognize themselves as within 
development studies or development policy—and an acceptance that within that audience 
there are multiple definitions of the bounds of “development theory, planning and practice”. 
One can then have an audience, and a global orientation, and not lose a priority to poor 
people. This has been shown, and momentum achieved, in the stream within development 
ethics that centres on ‘human development’, as well as in some of the great river of 
human rights work. Goulet’s own stream in development ethics remained small in 
comparison, for other reasons which we will come to. 
 
On methodology: stages of observation, theory, advice, practice 
 
Goulet came to his ideas through an ethnographic approach rather than centrally through 
reflection on welfare economics or Western moral philosophy. He called for ethical 
investigation and debate that are driven by experience, not primarily based in academic 
philosophy and pre-set academic frameworks; and thus for field-based identification and 
reflection on values and value conflicts and on societal, corporate and global 
responsibilities. He espoused a process-oriented, practice-centered, locality-specific 
approach not an elaborate generalized theoretical model. 
 Writing in 1971 just before Rawls’s A Theory of Justice appeared, he declared that 
philosophical ethics had become sterile, but also predicted the field’s revival. Much 
however of the revival has failed his test that ethics must start from experience, from “the 
marketplace…the factory…the planning board and the irrigation project” (1971a: 11). 
Contrary to Rawls and the mainstream of philosophical ethics he held that “Today’s 
ethicians are forced by reality to renounce pretensions towards ‘grand theory’” (1971a: 
11). Life is too complex. Goulet emphatically advocated what others call ‘practical 
ethics’ rather than a theoretical ethics that would supposedly then be ‘applied’. His vision 
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of development ethics was as part of this other stream in the revival of ethics: a practical 
ethics that includes medical ethics, business ethics, bio-ethics and care ethics. Only a 
practice-based development ethics could have adequate “regard for constraints, for 
human desires and limitations, and for the unpredictable vagaries of local conditions” 
(2006a: 105) and avoid becoming entrapped in oversimple conceptual schemata (2006a: 
Ch.10). 
 Goulet’s conception of development ethics, like that of Lebret or Peter Berger (1974), 
included strong attention to descriptive and explanatory ethics, to be done with more 
attention to dynamics than colonial ethnography had given. I will not attempt to 
summarise his views in descriptive ethics, but instead present and illustrate why he 
deemed such work central. Development ethics must start, he said, from study of how 
people in a given setting think and seek to make sense of the world and their lives and the 
forces and choices that face them. To grasp this “existence rationality” is essential if one 
is to offer relevant advice and not merely enunciate grand ideals. “Any ethic—of 
development, of social practice, or of cultural reconstruction—is simultaneously an ethic 
of goals and a ‘means of the means.’ No extrinsic grafting of norms can truly work: 
norms must be drawn from the inner dynamisms of each arena in which they operate. At 
stake is the difference between hollow moralism and genuine ethical strategies.” (Goulet 
1976: 40).  
 This descriptive and explanatory ethics, essential for serious ethically based strategy, 
requires a particular sort of research methodology, argued Goulet (1971a). He developed 
an approach from the French researcher Georges Allo for “integrating the living 
experience of ordinary people with philosophical investigation and empirical social 
science research” (Goulet 1992b: 19).ii For “in the case of values, the ‘object’ studied has 
no intelligibility apart from its ‘subjective’ resonances. …. [Further,] Values belong to 
realms of synthesis, not analysis: their proper domains are philosophy, poetry, meta-
analytical symbolism. Only under stringent conditions…is the study of values appropriate 
to social science. To reduce this synthesis of totality to that mere portion of reality which 
is measurable is to deprive life of its specificity and to falsify reality itself.” (Goulet 
1971b: 208).  
 Ethnographic attention shows up the unrealism of narrowly defined forms of 
‘realism’ found in some analyses in development economics, international relations and 
related policy studies. Let us take two examples, corruption in the South and 
consumption worldwide.  
 An ethnographically grounded descriptive development ethics takes us further than 
theories that look only at a grasping ‘economic man’ facing a set of opportunities for 
personal gain. Those have been applied with limited success in much contemporary 
analysis of corruption (e.g., Klitgaard 1988). Goulet held that exposure to the 
modernising powers of Europe and North America had disrupted an ‘equilibrium of 
desire’ in pre-modern societies, of not wanting and craving what is not widely attainable. 
Demonstration effects “remove[d] curbs on desire before providing individuals with the 
means to expand resources” (Goulet 1997a: 493). Aware of the malleability of effective 
desires, he stressed the explosive danger of boosting desire in advance of productive 
capacity (1971a, Ch.11), a trap avoided in East Asia but perhaps not elsewhere.  
 This unleashing of desires would not by itself explain corruption. What must also 
have been removed are the constraints set by proscriptions concerning acceptable means 
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and other inhibitions to the pursuit of maximum desire fulfilment. A second line of 
explanation therefore posits the felt strangeness of the public sphere in a new larger-scale 
society marked still by strong family and small-scale communal loyalties; the weakness 
as yet of new identities of professional and citizen; and weakly evolved corresponding 
peer groups, organisations and belief systems. Goulet argued that more complex societies 
operate a division between social spheres, a meta-principle that different principles apply 
in different spheres—for example, that ‘something for something’ is an exchange 
principle that must not be applied within the State. He suggested this division might not 
be easily adopted by simpler societies. 
Men learn to conduct their business life as though money were the supreme value, 
while continuing to abide by other values in their private lives. Such normative 
schizophrenia creates great personal stress, it is true. But it has at least protected 
modern societies from bearing the full consequences of the values to which they 
subscribe in the realm of productive activity. Non-modern societies, on the other 
hand, are not psychologically prepared to dissociate economic values from more 
intimate value spheres. If economic achievement is portrayed to them as 
important enough to warrant casting off all other concerns—including their most 
treasured family and religious practices—then why should their quest for more 
goods be moderated by considerations of the rights of others, prior claims of 
needier men, or the need for austerity in consumption so as to build up a solid 
production base in the nation? (Goulet, 1971a: 223-4; italics in the original). 
Societies not steeped in such dissociation could move to a value unitarism in which 
acquisitive and consumerist values become applied comprehensively, not only in 
restricted spheres.  
 Goulet’s readiness to look at the empirics, not only formal analytics, of consumption 
led him on towards its normative assessment, and to issues central to the meaning of 
development. Like Sen, Goulet observed that people in general rank orders of desire, not 
merely intensities of desire – there are different orders of goods, and preferences about 
desires, not merely preferences about goods. He referred to ideas from Aristotle onwards 
about such ranking of types of good; for example Aristotle’s category of ‘honorable 
goods’. People make these rankings for practical purposes, not only from love of 
distinction. Like Nussbaum later, Goulet stressed the need for a normative theory of 
consumption (e.g., 2006a, Chs. 3 & 4). “The plenitude of good is not proliferation of 
[economic] goods. … The defense of freedom, in the face of the seductive flattery of the 
myth of happiness [through consumption], is the fundamental task of any development 
ethics which is realistic and effective” (2006a: 34; emphasis in the original, first 
published in 1976). He was impressed by the attitude of pity that the nomadic groups he 
had lived with in the 1950s and 60s held toward people who are encumbered and 
dominated by things, by ‘stuff’. 
 Goulet employed the same language of freedom as Sen, and likewise posited freedom 
as a universally held value, but he had more substantive theories of desire and of 
freedom. He distinguished “freedom from wants”, obtained via the fulfilment of 
fundamental needs, and “freedom for wants”, where one is autonomous, in charge of and 
not slave to the determinants of want generation (1971a, Ch.6). In Sen’s system the 
danger of consumerism is a formal possibility not a central concern; in Goulet’s system it 
is central. Often freedom from some constraints is achieved in ways that reduce human 
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autonomy (1971a: 126). Restraint of material desires is an essential requirement for 
freedom (pp.121-2), he argued, not only a prudent measure along a path of accumulation. 
“Genuine wealth, the [early Fathers of the Christian Church] contend, resides in the 
internal freedom which makes one use material goods instrumentally to meet needs, and 
as a springboard for cultivating those higher spiritual goods which alone bring deeper 
satisfactions: virtue, friendship, truth, and beauty” (Goulet 2006a: 146). There is nothing 
specifically Christian in such claims, which are found in many traditions, and for 
example in the work of the 19
th
 century British economist Alfred Marshall, as well as in 
the accumulated results of modern research on well-being. Voicing such claims, in 
advance of and even now after these research findings, does not ensure popularity or 
attention; many writers prefer to pass by on the other side. The limited impact of Goulet’s 
development ethics reflects though also some other factors besides voicing of unpopular 
ideas, as we will see. 
 His policy ethics, including emphases on participation and on being the agent of one’s 
own development (see especially Goulet 1989a), grew out of the descriptive ethics that he 
built through his methodology of investigation. His model of value systems and value 
change posited an existential core that must be respected and built from, and an outer 
zone of flexibility where adaptation is possible. 
…to build development from tradition is the very opposite of reactionary. … 
Since the will of most Third World communities is anchored in the cultural values 
from which they derive their identity, integrity and sense of life’s meaning, there 
can be no justification for labeling a development strategy founded on the latent 
dynamisms in traditional, indigenous and local value orientations, as politically 
reactionary. On the contrary, the procedural commitment to respect values already 
in place constitutes a solid guarantee against falling in the twin traps of elitism 
and manipulation. To design and build development on tradition and indigenous 
values is to espouse a philosophy of change founded on a basic trust in the ability 
of people, no matter how oppressed or impoverished, to improve their lives, to 
understand the social forces that affect them, and eventually to harness these 
forces to processes of genuine human and societal development. (Goulet 1987: 
176) 
 Goulet’s model for policy ethics is demanding: the examination in depth of a project, 
programme, policy or even a national development strategy, identifying and reflecting on 
its multifarious value impacts; moving to an evaluation only through an in-depth 
description and attempt at understanding—as illustrated in his work on technology 
transfer, Mexico, Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka and Brazil. Some work by others is on 
similar lines, even maintained over several years (e.g., Porter et al. 1991, Richards 1985; 
Uphoff 1996). It requires exceptional inputs of sustained and wide-ranging attention, and 
is not readily funded. Mainstream work on value change, such as in the World Values 
Surveys and even on the growth of consumerism or individualism, sometimes builds up 
sustained time series but is done through large periodic sample surveys and has a very 
different character. 
 More work on development policy ethics has been directly normative, addressing 
urgent questions of choice, responsibility and priority, by application or extension of 
frameworks proposed as relevant from philosophical ethics. Compared to Goulet’s call 
for an existentialist ethnography, human-rights based approaches for example contain 
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ready-made frameworks for observation, monitoring and evaluation and for contributing 
in policy design. They seek to establish principles concerning rights and responsibilities, 
including with transnational application.  
 Limitations of Goulet’s type of field ethics, deeply illuminating as it can be, concern 
not just the time and skills it requires, but its relative disconnection from communicable 
theory. Goulet himself inevitably could do less fieldwork as he grew older. His mistrust 
of analytical philosophy that lacked a rich experiential base meant that he did not deepen 
his thinking much further by that route. Instead, he increasingly restated his earlier 
insights rather than extend them. What we see in the most interesting development ethics 
work in the past twenty years (e.g., Nussbaum & Glover 1995; Pogge 2002; Gready & 
Ensor 2005), including more and more in work presented in the Human Development and 
Capability Association, the International Development Ethics Association, et al., are 
attempts to combine case investigation and ethnographic insight with structured 
philosophical thinking. While in several respects Goulet had shown the way, we require 
also theoretical structures and systematic elaboration and ordering, in order to hold 
together and sustain practically-oriented movements. Here Goulet seemed to lack 
patience. He did not undertake further conceptual refinement of notions of freedom. His 
incisive “embryonic theory of priority needs” (1971a: 248) remained embryonic, never 
fully elaborated in relation to ongoing work in psychology and philosophy.
iii
 Arguably he 
sought a different audience, more popular and less academic, and different lines of 
influence. He had indeed a conscious theory of the roles of ethics and of his own role. To 
these we now turn. 
 
On influence: teaching, research and advocacy in ethics  
 
Ethics can play various roles, Goulet observed (1971a, Appendix 1). It has evaluative and 
critical roles in assessing and querying practices; a normative role in guiding the use of 
power and to constrain and coerce action; a role in grounding institutions, determining 
our view of what is normal, and our normal view, influencing where we look and how; a 
role to motivate action and “give exploiters a bad conscience”; and a pedagogical role, to 
teach critical awareness of the moral content of choices, including “as a pedagogy of the 
oppressed in case it is rejected as pedagogy by the oppressors” (1971a: 338). 
 Holding that “power without legitimacy must ultimately perish” (p. 341), he was 
aware that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not conveyed only through codes of ethics, but 
also through for example tradition and charisma. He had a clear vision then of the task 
facing development ethics, as more than “mere preachments addressed to the ‘good will’ 
and generosity of the powerful, and to the escapist sentiments of the powerless. It is…in 
the interstices of power and in the structural relationships binding the weak to the strong 
that development ethics must unfold itself” (1971a: 19).  
 Following Danilo Dolci, Goulet stressed the primary power in successful 
revolutionary change of “moral rather than material considerations”, including “a new 
sensitivity, a new capacity, a new culture, new instincts” (Dolci, cited by Goulet 2006a: 
25). At the same time Goulet urged that “mobilization strategies must protect the inner 
limits of old existence rationalities while expanding their outer boundaries” (1971a: 190), 
finding and using their “latent potential for change” (p.192). His chosen example of such 
a combination—revolution based on traditional identity—was Meiji Japan. Change that 
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does not threaten group survival, identity and solidarity may face little resistance (pp. 
204-5). 
 Goulet was concerned thus not only with “The Ethics of Power”—seeking to instruct 
and guide the Prince—but with “the Power of Ethics”, its force in constraining, 
motivating, inspiring, reconceiving. For him “politics as the art of the possible” covered 
also politics as the “art of redefining the possible” (1971a: 336). He declared that: 
Planners and other intellectuals find it so difficult to create a true professional 
ethic because they are crafters of words, ideas, and models. Consequently, they 
are timid about plunging into the heartland reality of ethics as existential power, 
and not as moral verbalism or conceptualism. Ethicists themselves constantly 
vacillate between ethical paralysis or compromise in the face of power, and 
energetic creativity newly released whenever they catch a faint glimpse of the 
power of ethics itself. …  the power of ethics to counter the power of wealth, of 
politics, of bureaucratic inertia, of defeatism, of social pathology. Such power can 
be won by a Gandhi, a Martin Luther King, a Danilo Dolci; it can never be 
institutionalized. But those others who lack ethical grandeur will inevitably lose 
hope in the face of larger powers, and accept compromises which strip their own 
ethics of its latent power. (Goulet 1976: 40-41) 
 Unfortunately, inspirational, charismatic leadership can as likely lead in bad 
directions as good. Further, leaders require a combination of a favourable conjuncture, 
capable supporters, strong networks, and relevant practicable proposals, in addition to an 
inspiring vision (Gasper 2007). Influenced by and interacting with figures such as Dolci, 
Fanon, Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich and the movement of liberation theology, Goulet’s 
emphasis on the possible prophetic roles of ethics, while valid, may not have provided the 
best guideline for his own work as a potential persuader through the crafting of words, 
ideas and models. He may have become dispirited in the era—one of charismatic 
leadership—of Reaganism, Islamism, born-again Protestantism, the suppression of 
liberation theology and the retreat from Vatican II, and of tragedies and disappointments 
in some countries he had engaged with closely such as Algeria, Sri Lanka or Guinea-
Bissau.  
 Goulet was clear, in Gramscian fashion, that much of what he said—like calling for 
voluntary austerity as the path to freedom—was in one sense utopian: “one can only be 
pessimistic” (1971a: 263). But he saw it also as the only realism. He took a long-run 
perspective, and was resigned to eras of conflict, violence and confusion, as inevitable in 
processes of major change (1971a: Ch. 13 and Conclusion). In particular he held that 
“unless the ground rules of production and decision-making are profoundly altered within 
the United States, a world order of authentic development has no chance to be born” 
(2006a: 90; originally published in 1970). By 1995 he remarked that “Sustainable 
development, because it is found too difficult, may…remain untried” (2006a: 155). 
  In such a historical setting we require not only recognition of the potential existential 
power of ethics, but careful theorization of influence and change.
iv
 Goulet constantly 
reiterated, through to perhaps his final published paragraph, that “the primary mission of 
development ethics…is to keep hope alive” (Goulet 2006b: 120). How? Three 
interconnected means are: incorporation of ideas in movements, incorporation in 
methods, and incorporation in education and training. Development ethics can seek in 
these ways to become, in Goulet’s key phrase, “the means of the means”, embedded in 
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and influencing the means of action: professionals and organisations, techniques and 
procedures, legislatures and courts. It must seek to not merely specify goals but to affect 
the processes and instruments through which the goals are, in practice, respecified and 
marginalised or given real weight. 
 
Methods of policy analysis 
Goulet’s perspectives did not become sufficiently embodied in methods and 
methodologies. He was aware of the central importance of how routine operation is 
structured, as seen in his work on incentives and indicators (e.g. Goulet, 1989b, 1992c), 
but was not fond of formalisms and formalised frameworks. He regretted “the excessive 
complexity and heaviness of [Lebret’s] methodological instruments” (Goulet 1974; 
reprinted at 2006a: 62). Yet incorporation into methods is a vital part of 
institutionalisation, and formal methods are often key instruments for influence. Later he 
acknowledged that “Lebret’s pre-planning studies offer a systematic way to engage in 
precisely such consultation” as is needed for a community to consider and clarify its 
value options and value choices (Goulet 2000; reprinted at 2006a: 180).  
 Various of Goulet’s ideas have become embedded by other authors in relevant 
methodologies. His type of value-focused approach to local investigation and action has 
grown in the work led by Robert Chambers (1997) and others. His approach to policy 
ethics is close to the value-critical policy analysis of Martin Rein (1976), Frank Fischer 
(1995), Ronald Schmidt (2006) and others, which has been elaborated and applied quite 
extensively. His rethinking of development cooperation (1971a, Ch.8) has been greatly 
advanced by David Ellerman (2005) amongst others.  
 More broadly, UNDP’s Human Development approach and the attempts to devise and 
apply human rights based approaches in development programming constitute important 
progress and suggest some lessons. Recent human rights based approaches go beyond 
listing and affirming human rights criteria, to using them to steer each stage of planning 
and management (see e.g. Gready & Ensor 2005). Similarly, the surprising degree of 
impact of the Human Development approach reflects more than a media strategy—the 
high profile launches and accessible form of the Human Development Reports, the 
attention-catching use of summary indicators that reveal more than does GNP per capita, 
and the evocative term ‘Human Development’—significant though those are. It reflects 
the integrating force of a theoretical perspective—the thinking of Sen, Nussbaum and 
others about capability, and of Haq, Jolly, Stewart, Streeten et al. on human 
development—that brings a rationale and connection across a range of activities: the 
selection of focus, the language and measures for description, the choice of illustrative 
cases, the identification of alternatives, tracing of effects, and evaluation of processes and 
outcomes (Gasper 2008). The human development indicators not only catch attention, but 
provide a route to surfacing and publicly discussing value choices. 
 
Education and training 
Goulet (1971a: Ch.8) espoused the educational model adopted by Lebret in his Paris 
institute: to train a corps of world developers, using a massive multidisciplinary syllabus 
and a professional code. He was not primarily interested in training apparatchiks or 
academics: “the aspiring generalist who does not gain his wisdom through the praxis of 
dialectical historical experience is doomed to fail” (1971a: 330). By ‘generalist’ Goulet 
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appears to have meant those in his own mould, “the philosopher of development, the 
specialist of generality” (2006a: 26). This can hardly be the main target-group. 
 The largest categories in development ethics education are general citizen 
education—including through popular media—and general school education. The UK 
and Ireland, for example, have taken steps in the space opened by national curriculum 
requirements for attention to international relations in general studies teaching. In the 
spaces of university and professional education several important alternatives exist. First, 
the special short course, including summer schools; second, the dedicated course within 
an academic or professional training programme; third, incorporation into other courses 
and training. The first two alternatives have the advantage, if the courses are optional, of 
keen minority audiences. They give a place to work with potential future key resource 
persons, and to test and develop ideas which can be used to interact with bigger 
mainstream audiences. But the larger target is the third alternative, incorporation into 
existing courses of policy analysis and planning, economics, public policy, management, 
social policy, research methodology, and indeed any foundation course in sociology, 
politics, economics, human geography or development studies. Those audiences are far 
larger, and the danger otherwise exists—seen sometimes in gender- and race-studies—
that consciousness-raising with small groups goes hand-in-hand with mistrust and 
increased resistance amongst majorities. Incorporation into existing ‘regular’ courses 
addresses also the central requirements for influence: to relate ethics ideas to other bodies 
of knowledge and to apply them in working procedures. Ethics teaching for not only a 
sympathetic self-selected minority is not easy to make effective and fruitful though. 
Camacho (2006) illustrates a practical approach, of not trying to enforce any one 
doctrine, but providing a space for attention, heightened awareness and joint reflection.  
 
Social movements and the dynamics of change 
Incorporation of ideas into social movements is typically necessary for major social 
change (Murphy 2005; Krznaric 2007). Work in development ethics has to connect with 
significant movements, and eventually with agencies, if it is to be heard, tested, informed, 
upgraded, accepted and used; and it should study the instances of successful connection. 
Haq’s induction of Sen into his UNDP work, for example, was part of the mobilization of 
a network of networks required for the coherence, credibility and communication of the 
human development paradigm. Haq brought together networks of several kinds, each 
necessary: from academe, not least from economics; from within United Nations 
organizations; from wider development organizations, such as the Society for 
International Development and the Third World Forum; plus intergovernment networks 
from his long service as official and Minister (Gasper 2007). He further ensured that he 
could retain unimpeded access to them, by obtaining editorial independence for the 
Human Development Report Office. 
 While sympathetic to the UNDP-based movement of human development and to 
movements of participatory research and action, Goulet’s active affiliation and quest for 
partners appears to have been especially within movements of progressive Christian 
thinking. Here the 1980s and 1990s were often times of retrogression instead. Compared 
to the 1970s Goulet’s influence declined, in the absence of vehicles—organizations, 
journals, a clearly encapsulated methodology, related movements—that could extend, 
apply and adapt his approach. The model of an ethical grandee or Parisian prophet, 
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dissemination of whose ideas looks after itself thanks to their power and elegance and the 
presence of a large waiting audience, did not fit. Two of the key audiences were too 
remote, physically or psychologically: movements of the poor who lived far away, and 
the Northern rich, asked to reflect about their riches and about their relation to the distant 
poor.  
 Goulet was temperamentally close in some ways to the international human rights 
movement or movements, which has tried to institutionalize ideas of great existential 
power. He had doubts in the 1980s, however, about its generalizing and sometimes rather 
Eurocentric vision (Goulet 1984). A decade later he felt that: “The present intellectual 
climate and the political conjuncture are both favorable to a serious discussion of human 
rights and policies on their behalf. But a monumental problem arises: there are too many 
rights, too many competing claims. … Thus the very proliferation of rights and claims is 
itself an obstacle to the implementation of any of them” (Goulet 1992: 243). Since then 
the human rights movement has continued to spread and gain influence, seen for example 
in campaigns for debt relief and for rights to food, water and basic drugs. There are 
lessons for the rest of development ethics, some perhaps sobering, some encouraging. 
 First, the rise of human rights thinking especially from the 1940s has not come 
primarily through ethics conferences or academic activities of any type. It represents a 
reaction to the experiences of totalitarianism in the mid 20
th
 century, as well as a longer 
history of reactions to colonialism and imperialism (Crawford 2002). Also of 
fundamental importance have been the rise of global communications, bringing a spread 
of images and life-stories that contribute to “an ethics of recognition” (Schaffer and 
Smith 2004). The lesson would be familiar to Goulet: that much of any pressure behind 
development ethics will be from crises, national and global; and part will come from 
growing interconnection and communication. Development ethics then needs, in business 
language, a communications strategy not limited to waiting for leaders of ethical 
grandeur. 
 Second, the significance of human rights thinking is not solely dependent on its 
incorporation in legal systems. Human rights-based approaches now give attention to 
influencing all stages in public policy and management; to action in business, civil 
society, community groups, and everyday life; and to action on and through attitudes, and 
virtues, not only through attempted declaration and enforcement of duties. In such ways 
the approaches have important impact, despite the problem of many competing rights-
claims. The general lesson for development ethics matches Goulet’s central theme: it 
must present ideas that function as “the means of the means”, pervading and influencing 
actual uses of the means of action. How should we organise for that intention? 
  
The organisation of development ethics 
 
I suggested that Goulet’s distinctive strengths came through his ethnographic and 
sociological approach, rather than through a rethinking of welfare economics or 
application of Western moral philosophy. His intense exposure in a series of small and 
marginal communities provided profound insights, but also perhaps a distancing from 
more abstracted and formal languages. Yet just as village ethics cannot suffice for more 
complex societies, so more elaborated, multi-part, dissociated and in some parts abstract, 
intellectual systems, methods and projects are needed in analytical and practical ethics 
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(Gasper 1996). We saw that Goulet’s type of work requires partnership with the streams 
derived from economics and philosophical ethics. He sought, and often reached, a broad 
audience, but unless one also reaches relevant specialists then one’s impact can be 
ephemeral. Reaching out to diverse important audiences requires diverse tools: 
sometimes eloquence and profundity, sometimes formalism and precision, sometimes 
standard working procedures, sometimes specific personal networks.  
 To take forward this work in building a field of development ethics that makes some 
difference, with systematic incorporation of ideas into methods, movements and 
education, what is an appropriate organisational format? Goulet argued that a disciplinary 
or (as an area within philosophical ethics) sub-disciplinary format is appropriate. We 
criticised him for investing too little in theoretical system-building. If theoretical 
deepening and formalisation are important, is not a separate (sub-)disciplinary space 
essential? But the need is not for a specialist space within academic philosophy. The 
analyses required lie at the interfaces of different branches of philosophy, social sciences, 
management and humanities, and of academic work and practical action. It is important 
to reach the ‘clerisy’ of specialists, the ‘religious orders’ of the modern intellect, but not 
to create a new such order that will not communicate with nor be heard by the existing 
ones. 
 An intellectual area that calls itself development ethics needs instead to function like 
a nursery, cultivating ideas and persons that will be transplanted, even if they might 
remain in contact. The nursery is not the long-term destination. Such a self-conception 
would leave it as a minor ghetto. Influence on mainstreams is the objective. The 
characteristic development ethics perspective described earlier—comparative, 
intercultural, international, interdisciplinary, change-oriented and close to practice—
implies that a disciplinary nest in which restricted and abstracted formulations of issues 
are pursued in great depth will not be ideal. It can form a permanent cocoon from which 
the fledgling does not graduate. 
 Goulet called for a form of philosophy which did graduate, into the world of action. 
We saw his advice: “…for moral philosophers to stop ‘moralizing’ and undertake serious 
analysis of ethical problems posed by development, underdevelopment, and 
planning…they must go to the marketplace, the factory, the planning board, and the 
irrigation project and create ethical strategies of social decision-making which enter into 
the dynamics and the constraint systems of major policy instruments: political, technical, 
and administrative” (Goulet 1988: 155). He never declared a moral position from on 
high, but based advice on in-situ investigation, as well as a perspective of long-term 
change that had been informed by history, social science and local immersion. Goulet 
moved beyond only highlighting the normative significance and priority of goals and 
criteria besides economic growth. He showed the centrality of such goals in motivating 
and guiding people’s behaviour; and he sought to incorporate justified normative criteria 
into systems of decision-making. This moves development ethics’ centre of gravity from 
philosophy towards anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics and management.  
 Yet, paradoxically, he called consistently for development ethics to be a distinct 
discipline and specialism, a sort of secular priesthood (e.g., Goulet 1988, 1997b). ‘The 
development ethicist’ was the protagonist in many of his writings, which remained set in 
the mould of his 1960s and 70s work. The envisaged development ethicist was a Goulet, 
engaged in technical cooperation programmes or employed as a specialist researcher and 
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adviser, a worker philosopher. He considered it “inevitable that a new discipline, based 
on systematic examination—both instrumental and philosophical—of comparative values 
must someday join the ranks of…comparative approaches to the study of development” 
(2006a: 26, originally written in 1976). In reality there has been as much regress as 
progress in this direction. Goulet’s own unusual career could not form a generalisable 
model.  
 Goulet’s insistence on evolution from tradition domestically in each country, and also 
on a separate specialism or sub-discipline of ‘development ethicists’, who should be 
added to decision-making in development policy and practice, form an uneasy 
combination. Where would a sub-discipline emerge except in North America where 
philosophical ethics is an enterprise of sufficient scale, in terms of numbers of courses 
and students and academics, for such a specialism to receive sustained attention? And 
what role would such implicitly expatriate or relatively distanced ethicists have in 
relation to domestic traditions? Goulet offered a parallel with specialist business- and 
medical-ethical advisors (1988: 160-2). But those in general live in the same cities as 
their clients. The paths of trying to influence methods, specialists and social movements 
are more relevant than trying to construct a new specialism or movement. To enrich and 
modify others’ work is more feasible and more fruitful. 
 For those working in development ethics, ‘discipline’ is a central concept that 
requires extended examination, just like ‘freedom’ or ‘need’ (see Gasper 2004 for one 
attempt). Goulet was aware of pitfalls in disciplinarity, and the vested interests of existing 
disciplinary redoubts that do not let new competitors readily emerge. Indeed he was 
based in a department of economics that was ultimately torn apart by conflict between a 
mono-disciplinary and an inter-disciplinary approach to economics. He himself never 
sought “to trespass on the proper autonomy of each discipline—which is something other 
than…hermetic closure upon oneself” (1960, republished at 2006a: 14)—nor did he seek 
“to win sectarian or partisan victories” (p.15). In arguing for development ethics as a 
separate discipline he perhaps though misread the challenge. The demands for 
interdisciplinary communication in development ethics are so central, and the demands of 
interdisciplinary communication so considerable, that a disciplinary or sub-disciplinary 
format does not fit well here. 
 Attempts to build a sub-discipline in academic philosophy have had slight impact. 
The difficulty to draw clear boundaries for development ethics contributes amongst other 
factors to the non-emergence of a sharply distinctive field. If we see development ethics 
in, for example, Dower’s sense—as the field that asks “How ought a society to exist and 
move into the future?”—then it cannot be a tidy subdiscipline. Rather it is a concern that 
belongs in many choice arenas. The place for development ethics is as an inter-
disciplinary field in which a variety of relevant disciplines exchange and enrich each 
other (Gasper 1994). Development ethics authors in practice come from all backgrounds, 
not predominantly from philosophy. 
 Is such a framing of development ethics as an interdisciplinary meeting place, a 
looser academic and professional forum, truly fruitful as well as more feasible? If one is 
not a discipline – a self-enclosed, self-referential territory with one’s own induction and 
indoctrination, system of rewards and punishments, loyalties and captive population, 
border controls and flag – can one achieve and maintain the focus, continuity, and critical 
mass needed for deep intellectual work? Truong and I suggest that in fact most of the 
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areas of creativity and energy in development ethics lie at intersection points between a 
stream of practice—whether economic policy, human rights activism, emergency relief, 
business management or whatever—and a stream of ethically sensitive theorizing, 
whether from socio-economics, quality of life studies, religions, feminisms, 
jurisprudence, or so on (Gasper & Truong 2005). There are multiple linked sites of such 
conversations. Development ethics includes and interconnects these sites. To do this it 
has various ‘nursery’ functions: in shared conceptualisation, cross-fertilisation, education 
and training. These need a long-term institutional base of  professional groups and 
associations, textbooks, journals, even traditions. But since the primary task is one of 
reaching out, and of connecting diverse other streams of theory and practice, it is more 
realistic and accurate to describe the resulting field as one of interdisciplinary interaction 
rather than as a new discipline. We see this principle largely at work in the Human 
Development and Capability Association, and in the change of subtitle of the Journal of 
Human Development from ‘Alternative Economics in Action’ to ‘A Multi-Disciplinary 
Journal for People-Centred Development’.   
 In his late work Goulet recognised “two different roads” for development ethics 
(1997b: 1166). The first was his own model, of “a new discipline with distinctive 
methods and research procedures” (loc. cit.). The second road was of development ethics 
as a type of work that overlaps with other types, with which it cooperates as partners in 
interdisciplinary activity. Goulet still saw prospects in the first road, and called his article 
“Development Ethics: A New Discipline”. But he had become aware of the alternative 
model, of inter-disciplinary learning (Goulet 1992b). This path has been followed much 
more. An important number of development practitioners and social scientists have 
become more self-consciously and systematically ethics-oriented, for example through 
the spread of rights-based approaches and human development perspectives. The required 
investigation in the marketplace, factory, planning board and irrigation project has been 
done not by philosophers, but by ethically aware anthropologists, economists, 
geographers, health specialists, journalists, planners, political scientists and others. In his 
final book Goulet continued to talk of using findings from “other disciplines” (2006a: 
xxxiii), as if development ethics was a comparable discipline. But he recognised 
development ethics “as an intrinsically interdisciplinary effort” (p. xxxii), and spoke of 
‘discipline’ often now simply in the everyday sense, as a disciplined activity—
“systematic, cumulative, communicable, and testable” (loc. cit.).  
 Goulet was determined not “to pursue a vision of justice shrouded in a Utopian halo 
because it is not deeply imbedded in the world of real constraints” (2006a: 3). In the same 
spirit I have tried to draw lessons from his remarkable career, for ongoing work on 
human development and development ethics. 
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i
 On other aspects of Goulet’s work, see his own overviews (e.g., 1976, 1995, 1997a, 2006b), before 
proceeding to, especially, The Cruel Choice. On the ethical principles he advocated—(1) self-
determination, individual and collective (2) "decent sufficiency" of basic goods for all, (3) solidarity, and 
(4) nonelite participation and democratic decision making—in ways that anticipate and can still enrich 
much of the later work on human development, Crocker (2006) and Chs. 4, 5 and 8 in Goulet’s 
Development Ethics (1995) provide introductions. Crocker makes comparisons to the later work and also 
suggests where it has advanced on Goulet. 
ii 
Appendix 3 to The Cruel Choice outlined its four stages. The approach is similar to the 'Verbal Image' 
form of reporting presented by Howard Richards (1985), that aims to give a broad picture, a description and 
understanding of how a program works in its societal context, not a focus only on a few aspects taken out 
of their context. It thus tries to ensure coverage of non-measurable impacts, to grasp the human meanings in 
situations, and to make sense, to outsiders and insiders, of what has happened; and to have insiders 
systematically check the ‘verbal image’ that is constructed on the basis of their contributions. See Richards, 
pp.79-85; Lee & Shute (1991). 
iii
 Thus the important 1976 presentations that form Chs. 3 and 4 of his 2006 book were not extended later to 
relate to the wealth of relevant material from contemporary social science and philosophy. 
iv
 See Gasper (2006) for a complementary discussion of these themes. 
